We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach.
Introduction
Theoretical approaches to account for tax compliance are often based on the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which incorporates potential penalties, tax rates and audit probabilities as basic parameters in order to evaluate the expected utility of taxpayers. In the most basic version of this neoclassical standard scheme the behavior of all taxpayers enters via the average degree of risk aversion, related to the structure of the underlying utility function. However, the reasons and motivations for tax evasion in a society are manifold and it would obviously be desirable to relate the behavior of individuals, embedded in their social network, to global parameters such as risk aversion. In some sense this hierarchy of modelling has a close match in physics where phenomenological laws of thermodynamics can be derived within the concepts of statistical mechanics which are applied to the individual constituents of a macroscopic system. For example, thermodynamic parameters such as the temperature of an ideal gas can be traced back to the average energy which is distributed among the various degrees of freedom of the individual gas molecules.
Within the economics domain, in particular tax evasion, the approach by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) would correspond to the phenomenological level of description. On the other hand so-called agent-based models have been set up as a comparatively new tool for analyzing tax compliance issues on a more individual (i.e. 'microscopic') level. An essential feature of any agent-based model is the direct interaction between agents, which is combined with some process that allows for changes in individual behavior patterns.
According to Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) agent-based tax evasion models may be categorized into an economics and econophysics domain. The latter III has been initiated by Lima and Zaklan (2008) ; Zaklan et al. (2008 Zaklan et al. ( , 2009 ) and Lima (2010) by analyzing a suitable modification of the Ising model (Ising, 1925) , originally known from the theory of magnetism. In contrast, if the interaction process is driven by parameter changes that induce behavioral changes via utility functions and (or) by stochastic processes that do not have physical roots, these models belong to the economics domain. Examples include Mittone and Patelli (2000) ; Davis et al. (2003) ; Bloomquist (2004 Bloomquist ( , 2008 ; Antunes et al. (2007) ; Korobow et al. (2007) ; Szabó et al. (2009 Szabó et al. ( , 2010 ; Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) ; Méder et al. (2012) ; Nordblom andŽamac (2012); Andrei et al. (2014) ; Hokamp (2014) ; Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) of which some are summarized by Bloomquist (2006) , Pickhardt and Prinz (2014) , and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) .
In previous work Seibold and Pickhardt (2013) ; Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) and more recently Hokamp and Seibold (2014) have extended the Ising-based econophysics approach to tax evasion toward the implementation of different agent types. This theory is able to reproduce results from agent-based economics models (Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010) and therefore should be appropriate for a quantitative analysis of tax compliance. Moreover, the econophysics route to tax evasion may provide the formal framework to construct a phenomenological 'global' theory starting from a microscopic 'agentbased' description. However, before tackling this ambitious task it is of course necessary to provide an econophysics description of tax evasion which comprises the main ingredients inherent in contemporary neoclassical approaches based on the work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) .
In this regard, one crucial aspect which we aim to improve in the present paper concerns the time evolution of social norms within the network of agents. In fact, all previous econophysics works mentioned above classified the individual agents by two parameters, (i) a local field describing the moral attitude of agents toward tax evasion and (ii) a local temperature which governs the susceptibility of agents with regard to behavioral changes. Both parameters compete with the interaction between agents which aims to conform the agent's behavior within their social network.
However, these parameters were fixed and therefore behavioral changes only occured as a result of the statistical evaluation of the dynamics incorporating the aforementioned competition between interaction of agents and their moral attitude and/or local temperature, respectively.
Here we aim to go beyond this static description by incorporating social norm updating into the agent-based econophysics approach to tax evasion. In particular, we allow for dynamical changes in the moral attitude of agents due to public goods provision. Within standard agentbased models this issue has been studied by Mittone and Patelli (2000) ; Antunes et al. (2007) ; Szabó et al. (2009 Szabó et al. ( , 2010 Méder et al. (2012) ; Hokamp (2014) ; Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) with partially contradictory results. For example, Szabó et al. (2009 Szabó et al. ( , 2010 showed that increasing the level of governmental services (e.g. health care) leads to less tax evasion. Note that the authors consider more than 20 employment types and four agent types, namely (i) elected administration, (ii) tax authority, (iii) workers, and (iv) entrepreneurs. In contrast, Hokamp (2014) finds the counterintuitive result that income tax compliance may decrease with raising marginal per capita returns. The latter analysis is based on a model with back auditing and four agent types which are also implemented in the present paper (cf. Sec. 3).
V
The paper is organized as follows. In order to put our investigations into the appropriate economic context we present in Sec. 2 a brief literature review regarding public goods provision and tax compliance. In Sec. 3 we outline the basic ingredients of our econophysics model [cf. Seibold and Pickhardt (2013) ; Hokamp and Seibold (2014) ; Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) ] and exemplify the approach for a society with homogeneous agents which sets the stage for the following discussion. The procedure how the provision of public goods influences on selfish agents within our model is presented in Sec. 4 and corresponding results are shown in Sec. 5. We finally conclude our discussion in Sec. 6.
Public Goods Provision and Tax Compliance: A Literature Review
The modern root of public goods theory dates back to the seminal work of Samuelson (1954) introducing a condition for Pareto-optimal allocations: the sum of individual's marginal rate of substitution has to equal the marginal rate of transformation. Pickhardt (2003 Pickhardt ( , 2006 surveys modern public goods theory and the relevant literature therein, e.g. Musgrave (1939) ; Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( , 1955 ; Musgrave (1999) ; Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998) . Among other things, he observes a large diversity in defining and using the terminus 'public good' that is to some extent conflicting or even contradicting. In our paper we adopt the consumption-act-approach of Pickhardt (2003) does not mean that the same subjective benefit must be derived, or even that precisely the same product quality is available to both.' However, with respect to income tax evasion and public goods provision we briefly review below theoretical works of Cowell and Gordon (1988); Falkinger (1988 Falkinger ( , 1991 Falkinger ( , 1995 ; Cowell (1992) and Bordignon (1993) , as well as experiments by Alm et al. (1992a,b) ; Mittone (2006) ; Alm (2010) and Bazart and Pickhardt (2011) . For details see Hokamp (2013) . Cowell and Gordon (1988) Falkinger (1988) adds the notion of tax as a price for public services to the basic flat tax setting of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) . Note that these governmental provided public goods are non-rival -i.e. each agent may consume the same amount -but individual's utility of consumption may differ. Falkinger (1988) Falkinger, 1988, pp. 392-393) .
Falkinger (1991) addresses a reverse question related to Cowell and Gordon (1988) , that is: How might tax evasion influence the optimal level of public goods provision? Using additive and strictly concave utility functions Falkinger (1991) shows that the impact of flat tax evasion on the optimal supply of public goods depends on the magnitude of decreasing individual's absolute risk aversion. To analyze inequity Cowell (1992) enlarges the publicly-supplied-goods-approach of Cowell and Gordon (1988) while maintaining their notion of public goods (cf. above). As pointed out by Cowell (1992, pg. 541) , the essential problem of economic, psychological and social effects -which simultaneously influence individual's flat tax evasion behavior and public goods provision -concentrates to one single crucial question:
'[c]an the person affect inequity directly by his own actions?'. Bordignon (1993) extends the setting of Cowell and Gordon (1988) via introducing taxpayers' heterogeneity that refers to income, magnitude of private consumption and audit probability. In particular, Bordignon (1993, pg. 359 ) examines '[. . . ] the fairness of the fiscal system [. . . ]' depending on tax structure, public goods provision and subjects' beliefs or individuals' estimates of other peoples' tax evasion. He then finds that poor taxpayers ceteris paribus evade more (less) in absolute terms than rich subjects, if the whole population is faced with low (high) tax rates. To allow for a comparison with Falkinger (1988) and Cowell (1992) the author drops the assumption of agents' heterogeneity and derives Pareto-optimal provision levels of public goods. Thenwithin his homogeneous fairness-approach assuming under-provision (over-provision) of public goods - Bordignon (1993) shows that raising the tax rate leads to zero (positive) tax evasion; where positive tax evasion ceteris paribus increases (decreases) with low (high) tax rates.
Falkinger (1995) takes an economic and a psychological point of view on flat tax evasion and equity that both base on Falkinger (1988 Falkinger ( , 1991 and Cowell (1992) . Yet, Falkinger (1995) explains counterintuitive results of Cowell (1992) an increase of penalties than males, (ii) females evade less than males, and (iii) males react stronger than females to positive lottery rewardsceteris paribus yielding higher tax compliance rates.
Finally, to sum up reviewed neoclassical theoretical and experimental applications present a wide range of conclusions, effects, findings and results that may appear to some extent ambiguous, counterintuitive, or actually conflicting and contradicting with respect to income tax evasion, public goods provision and their inter dependencies. Analogous discrepancies also appear in agent-based models as already outlined in Sec. 1.
In the next section we proceed by introducing our econophysics agentbased model for which we implement the influence of public goods in Sec. 4.
The Agent-Based Econophysics Approach
Our considerations are based on the Ising model hamiltonian
where J describes the coupling of Ising variables (spins) S i = +1,−1 between adjacent lattice sites denoted by i j . In the present context
Calculations have been done for a two-dimensional square lattice with dimension 1, 000 × 1, 000 and periodic boundary conditions, i.e. a torus XI structure. We note that the results are not sensitive to the specific lattice geometry. Within a similar econophysics model this issue has been analyzed by Zaklan et al. (2009 Zaklan et al. ( , 2008 and Lima and Zaklan (2008) is available upon request. The probability for a spin at lattice site i to take the values S i = ±1 is given by (2013) and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) .
In analogy to Zaklan et al. (2008 Zaklan et al. ( , 2009 ); Lima (2010) and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) we further implement the probability p a of an audit. If tax evasion is detected the agent is forced to stay compliant over h time steps (penalty period). Such a procedure has also been implemented in a randomized variant in Lima and Zaklan (2008) . We also note that it is possible to incorporate lapse of time effects, i.e. the situation where a detected agent is also screened over several years in the past by the tax authorities (i.e. backaudit). This variant has been studied within an agent-based econophysics tax compliance model in Seibold and Pickhardt (2013) .
Since in the following we implement the influence of public goods provision which affects selfish a-types only, it is instructive to consider the case of a society with all agents being of the same type. The resulting percentage of tax evasion as a function of time is shown in Fig. 1 for two penalty periods (h = 5, 10).
The first case of endogenous non-compliant selfish agents is shown in Fig. 1a where at time step zero all agents are set to non-compliance, i.e. the fraction of non-compliant taxpayers is p non−cp = 1. Due to the enforcement mechanism, p non−cp is significantly reduced because at each time step a certain percentage of the remaining non-compliant agents are forced to become compliant. Before reaching a stationary value small oscillations are observed since after h time steps the first detected agents can become non-compliant again. Fig. 1b reports the result for copying b-type agents. As initial condition all agents are set to 'compliant'. Since b-types tend to copy the behavior of their social network only few of them change their behavior and the equilibrium value for tax evasion approaches a rather small value between 4% and 5%. It should be noted that the equilibrium value is independent of the initial condition. If we would have set all agents to non-compliant at time step zero, the audits would have reduced the percentage of tax evasion to the same equilibrium value than shown in Fig. 1b .
The time evolution for ethical c-type agents is reported in Fig. 1c .
Here the initial fraction of non-compliant taxpayers is set to p non−cp = 0 and there is only a very small probability that one of the agents becomes non-compliant. Since ethical agents avoid tax evasion the results are also almost independent of the audit probability. Hence, any positive audit probability would be inefficient in this case.
Finally, Fig. 1d shows the percentage of tax evasion for random dtype agents. Since these agents act by chance their probability for changing their behavior from compliant to non-compliant or vice versa would be of the order of ∼ 50% without any audit. The enforcement mechanism then leads to a further reduction for the equilibrium value of p non−cp = 0 where larger penalty periods naturally lead to a stronger reduction.
The Influence of Public Goods Provision
In our previous considerations the local fields for the ethical (ctype) and selfish (a-type) agents where initially fixed and independent of the time evolution. For ethical agents this means a deep seated moral attitude inculcated by education, religious convictions [cf.
Heinemann and Schneider (2011) Table 1 . Summary of how changes in public goods provision and behavioral change of a-types influence on the (im)moral attitude change of these agents.
The provision of public goods does not change significantly, i.e. it is below the threshold of perception ∆ p min of selfish agents. The agent therefore keeps its moral attitude and the field remains unaltered.
The provision of public goods has changed significantly (i.e. it is above the threshold of perception ∆ p min of selfish agents) while the agent did not change its behavior. It is not perceivable for the rational agent whether a change of its behavioral norm would lead to any advantage. Therefore also in this case the agent tends to keep its moral attitude and the field remains unaltered.
The agent has changed its behavior from noncompliant to compliant. Simultaneously the provision of public goods has significantly increased. The agent therefore recognizes a confirmation for its behavioral change and thus becomes less 'unethical'. This is implemented by a change of its local field B i → B i +∆ B which thus becomes less negative.
The agent has changed its behavior from non-compliant to compliant but the provision of public goods has significantly decreased. The agent therefore concludes that its behavioral change is not honored and thus becomes more 'unethical'. The corresponding change in the local field is
The agent has changed its behavior from compliant to non-compliant while the provision of public goods has significantly increased. The agent is therefore encouraged in its unethical behavior which is implemented by a change in the local field
The agent correlates its change from compliant to non-compliant behavior with the decrease of the provision of public goods suggesting a more ethical behavior. Therefore the local field changes as
The new parameters entering our approach are thus (i) ∆ p min (threshold of perception) reflecting the lower bound in the provision of public goods which can be perceived by an agent, and (ii) the rate of adaption ∆ B with which the a-type agent adjusts its behavior to a change in the provision of public goods. In our simulations we specify ∆ p min by a cer-XVII tain percentage of compliant agents to which it is obviously proportional.
The parameter ∆ B is chosen for each a-type agent i as a random number 0 < ∆ B i < ∆ B max . Table 2 
Changes in Public Goods Provision ∆ p min
Threshold of Perception for
Changes in Public Goods Provision Table 2 . Compendium of parameters determining the present multi-agent model. Note that temperature and magnetic field are measured in units of the exchange coupling J ≡ 1.
Results
In Fig. 2 we investigate the influence of public goods provision on a society consisting of 100% selfish a-type agents for various rates of adaption ∆ B max and two thresholds of perception ∆ p min = 1% (upper panel) and ∆ p min = 5% (lower panel). This feedback influences on the local field distribution P(B i ) which is now determined self-consistently as described above. At time step t n = 0 selfish a-types are given a flat distribution of local fields confined to the range −10 < B i < −20 and which is shown by the black curve in the main panels of Fig. 2 . Note that this is a generalization of Lima and Zaklan (2008) which have used a single field value.
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However, the feedback of public goods leads to a redistribution of P(B i )
which for large times becomes stationary and for different ∆ B max and ∆ p min is shown in the main panel of Fig. 2 .
Interestingly one observes two regimes in the distribution of local fields. For small ∆ B max the distribution transforms into a Gaussian and shifts to larger mean values B mean which are still in the range B mean < 0,
i.e. the majority of agents is still characterized as non-compliant taxpayers. From the insets to Fig. 2 we observe that the dynamics in this case is similar to the one without feedback of public goods. Due to the shift of P(B) to larger mean values a slight reduction in the stationary value of tax evasion becomes visible, especially for larger thresholds of perception.
Above a critical value of the adaption rate (∆ B crit max ≈ 2.5 for ∆ p min = 1 and ∆ B crit max ≈ 4.5 for ∆ p min = 5) one observes a broad distribution with a mean value which is now deep in the positive B-regime, i.e. most of the selfish a-type agents show a dominant compliant behavior. As a consequence the stationary value of tax evasion (insets to Fig. 2 ) is now strongly reduced and the remaining tax evaders are solely due to the 'negative B' agents in the tail of P(B).
We emphasize that the distributions shown in the main panels of Andreoni et al. (1998) . Similar agent shares have also been investigated by Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) . We choose an adaption rate of ∆ B max = 4 so that for small threshold of perception p min = 1% (panel a) the majority of a-type agents undergoes a transition towards compliant behavior (cf. Fig. 2) . As a consequence the fraction of evaders for societies consisting of 50%, 40%, and 30% atypes is drastically reduced as is apparent from Fig. 3a . This reduction becomes less pronounced for smaller a-type shares (e.g. 20% a-types).
In fact, the transition of a-types from non-compliance to compliance observed in Fig. 2 is driven by a significant change (enhancement) in the public goods provision. Now a large share of c-types obviously constitutes the fraction of compliant agents and therefore to the public goods provision but this contribution is constant over time. On the other hand, the behavioral change of a-types is induced by a concomitant change in the public goods provision and this change is naturally reduced when the fraction of c-types becomes to large. Therefore we observe only moderate to small reduction in tax evasion for a-type shares of 20%, 10%, and 0%. Fig. 3b reports analogous results for a larger threshold of perception p min = 5%. From the previous results shown in Fig. 2 we know that for this parameter the mean value of the field distribution for a-types is still in the negative range so that non-compliance is predominant. As a consequence also the effective share of non-compliant agents for the composed society is only moderately reduced upon allowing for the feedback from public goods provision.
Discussion and Outlook
We have investigated the influence of public goods provision on tax evasion within an econophysics model which describes the interaction of various behavioral types of agents. Within our framework only selfish (atypes) agents are susceptible to the provision of public goods and we have shown that their behavioral attitude towards tax evasion is determined by a dynamic local 'field-parameter' B i . As a result we find that an initially flat distribution P(B i ) is altered self-consistently due to the feedback of public goods provision leading to a generic shift towards larger field value (increased 'morality' of agents). This in turn can reduce tax evasion in agreement with previous investigations within the economics domain Szabó et al. (2010) . Also experimental data in the context of tax evasion Alm et al. (1992a,b) support the finding that compliance increases when taxpayers receive a public good in return for their payment. On the other hand Hokamp (2014) implements public goods provision via an utility function which is the crucial factor for the counterintuitive result that income tax evasion may increase providing a higher level of public goods. 
